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Abstract. The multi-agent resource allocation problem corresponds to
the negotiation of m resources among n autonomous agents, in order to
maximize a social welfare function. Contrary to some former studies, the
purpose is neither here to simply determine a socially optimal resource
allocation nor to prove the existence of a transaction sequence leading
to this optimum, but to ﬁnd a transaction sequence among agents in
practice, for any type of contact networks. With this intention, we study
various agent behaviors in order to identify which one leads the most
often to an optimal resource allocation. The reached allocation can be
viewed as an emergent phenomenon, that arises from local interactions
among the agents.
After a study of diﬀerent transaction types, we show that, among the
set of studied transactions, the so called “social gift” transaction, is the
most eﬃcient one for solving the resource allocation problem associated
with the utilitarian social welfare.
1 Introduction
The multi-agent resource allocation problem, which is at the interface of Com-
puter Science and Economics, has been studied for a long time, either within
a centralized or a distributed framework. In the studies with a centralized ap-
proach, the agents report their preferences on the resources to an auctioneer,
which then determines the ﬁnal resource allocation. Within this context, authors
[2,11] have suggested diﬀerent transaction models for given types of auctions. In
the studies with a distributed approach, the initial resource allocation evolves
by means of local negotiations among the agents.
An optimal allocation is sometimes a hazy notion in the literature. Let us
recall the deﬁnitions of the solutions of interest.
Global optimum: A resource allocation is a global optimum if there does not
exist any other resource allocation with a better social value. A global optimum
is independent of the types of transactions that are allowed among the agents.2
Moreover, the social value is unique but several resource allocations can cor-
respond to it. However, depending on the initial allocation or on the allowed
transaction types, this optimum may not be reachable.
T-global optimum: A resource allocation is a T-global optimum if there does
not exist any sequence of transactions, belonging to the set of transactions T,
that allows reaching a resource allocation with a greater social welfare value.
Such an allocation is most of the time suboptimal.
A ﬁrst set of studies focuses on the mathematical properties related to the
types of considered transactions. A classiﬁcation of the basic transactions has
been established along with theorems on the existence or the non-existence of
a speciﬁc transaction sequence, from any initial resource allocation to a global
optimum in [10]. However, these studies do not exhibit any process that can
be used to reach the optimal resource allocation: They only proved its exis-
tence. Along the same lines, mathematical properties on some classes of utility
functions and payment functions have been studied in [5] in order to design ne-
gotiation processes, which terminate after a ﬁnite number of iterations. In [6],
the authors study the acceptability criterion and the transaction properties, but
do not provide any explicit negotiation process.
In a second set of studies, the authors deﬁned new agent behaviors. Some of
them have identiﬁed conditions favoring equitable deals [7] and others have stud-
ied envy-freeness in the resource allocation process [3,4]. None of these studies
can exhibit a sequence of acceptable transactions (i.e., that satisfy the criteria
imposed by the agents) from an initial resource allocation to a T-global or a
global optimum. In addition, no comparison was made between the social value
of the resource allocation that is reached at the end of the negotiation process
and the globally optimal social value.
In this study, our purpose is to design a negotiation process which is able
to converge, in practice, either towards a global optimum, or towards a near
optimal solution. Section 2 deﬁnes the transactions that are used in this study,
and discusses the convergence issues of the negotiation process. Section 3 details
the experiment protocol and the evaluation criteria of the negotiation processes.
Finally, Sect.4 investigates further the social gift transaction, and the impact of
the agent behavior in a negotiation process based on such transactions.
1.1 Multi-agent resource allocation problem
The multi-agent resource allocation problem is deﬁned by a set of autonomous
agents, that are able to locally negotiate their resources. Let us consider a multi-
agent system where R = {r1,...,r m} is the ﬁnite set of available resources. We
assume the resources to be initially distributed over a population of n agents:
A = {a1,...,a n}. Each agent a owns a set of resources, denoted by Ra.T h e
preferences of the agents are represented by a utility function: ua : R→IR. A
resource allocation o is a partitioning of all the resources among the agents, and
can be expressed using the resource set of each agent: O = {R1,...,R a,...,R n).
Let O be the set of all possible allocations.3
The usual deﬁnition of a transaction is the following one: A transaction δ =
(O,O ) is a pair of resource allocations, where O and O  deﬁne the state of the
multi-agent system respectively before and after a given negotiation involving a
given subset of agents. In practice, an agent does not have a global view of the
system. This is the reason why, in our study, we consider that initially, agents
only know their preferences and their neighbor list. This implies that transactions
are based on local information only. Let Ra↔a be the set of involved resources
during a transaction between agents a and a .
Deﬁnition 1 (Transaction). A transaction, initiated by an agent a and in
which agents a ,a   ,... are involved, is a list of resource sets that are exchanged
between the agent initiator and the involved agents.
δa =[ Ra↔a,R a↔a,...]. (1)
In our study, we focus on a homogeneous agent society, in which resources are as-
sumed discrete, not shareable, not divisible, not consumable and unique. Hence,
the resources cannot be modiﬁed by the agents, but only transacted during the
negotiation process.
1.2 Contact Network
The contact network represents the graph of the relationships among the agents:
Each agent has a list of neighbors with whom he is able to communicate. Most of
the studies rely on the hypothesis of a complete and symmetric contact network.
Symmetric means that if agent a knows agent a ,t h e na  knows a.C o m p l e t e
implies that any agent is able to negotiate with any other agent in a multi-agent
system: This has a strong impact on the resource allocation process.
However, this hypothesis is not realistic as soon as real world applications
are considered. For instance, in the case of social networks, a person only knows
a subset of the overall set of actors in the network. In this study, we consider
that the contact network can be any connected graph, ranging from a complete
graph to a small-world.
According to the allowed transaction types, a negotiation process which con-
verges towards an optimal resource allocation in the case of a complete contact
network, may only converge toward a sub-optimal resource allocation in the
case of a restricted contact network. The mean connectivity degree of a contact
network is deﬁned in this study as the average number of neighbors of an agent.
1.3 Social welfare
Social welfare functions [1,9] are usually used in order to evaluate a multi-agent
system like a whole, through a welfare evaluation of each agent in the system.
Deﬁnition 2 (Utilitarian social welfare). The utilitarian social welfare, de-
noted by swu, is deﬁned as the summation of all agent welfare. For a given
resource allocation O:
swu(O)=
 
a∈A
ua(Ra)=
 
a∈A
 
r∈Ra
ua(r).4
Deﬁnition 3 (Egalitarian social welfare). The egalitarian social welfare,
denoted by swe, is deﬁned by the utility of the poorest agent. For a given resource
allocation O:
swe(O)=m i n
a∈A
ua(Ra)=m i n
a∈A
 
r∈Ra
ua(r).
The purpose of our study is to design practical resource negotiation processes
among agents, which guarantee that the negotiations end after a ﬁnite number
of steps, with a ﬁnal resource allocation that is as close as possible to the optimal
social value, for any arbitrary connected contact network.
2T r a n s a c t i o n
In a multi-agentresource allocationproblem, compensatory payments are usually
allowed during the negotiation process. Allowing the compensatory payments,
from an agent’s point of view, corresponds to an extension of the acceptable
transaction set. However, even if the use of money is constrained (no money
creation during a transaction), there is often no limit on agent budgets in or-
der to perform the transactions in most published studies. Questions related to
compensatory payments are beyond the scope of our study and, hence, are not
studied in the sequel. The agent preferences are expressed by means of k-additive
utility functions [8], with positive utilities. Moreover, our study is restricted to
the most widely used transaction family: Bilateral transactions in which only
two agents at a time can be involved.
2.1 Convergence
Sandholm [10] studied the existence of a rational or a non rational sequence
of transactions towards an optimal resource allocation. For the case of origi-
nal contracts, i.e., of bilateral transactions involving the purchase of a resource,
Sandhom proved that there always exists a sequence of non rational original con-
tracts leading, from any initial resource allocation, to a global optimum while, in
the case of rational original contracts, a sequence usually exists only for reaching
a local optimum transaction. No practical algorithm with such a guarantee is
proposed. We next discuss further the cases where transactions are rational or
more generally subject to some acceptability criteria.
2.2 Acceptability criteria
In order to negotiate in an appropriate way, acceptability criteria are usually
enforced with respect to the agent behavior. They restrict a lot the set of ac-
ceptable transactions. The negotiation process ends when no agent is able to
ﬁnd an acceptable transaction.
Let us assume that, at a given time, an agent a initiates a transaction
δ(O,O ) with an agent a , resulting in an evolution of the resource allocation
O = {...,R i,...,R j,...} towards a new one O  = {...,R  
i....,R  
j,...}.5
Deﬁnition 4 (Rational agent). A rational agent is an agent who only accepts
transactions that increase his utility. If the agent a is rational, he accepts a
transaction only if:
ua(R 
a) >u a(Ra).
The rationality criterion is the most widely used in the literature, especially in
the case of non cooperative selﬁsh agents.
Deﬁnition 5 (Rational transaction). A rational transaction is a transaction
in which all involved agents are rational. If a transaction is rational, involved
agents accept it if:
ua(R 
a) >u a(Ra) and ua(R 
a) >u a(Ra).
Proposition 6. A multi-agent resource allocation process that uses rational
transactions ends after a ﬁnite number of transactions.
However, the restrictions imposed by the rationality criterion to the set of
possible acceptable transactions may lead to a sub-optimal resource allocation
at the end of the negotiation process.
Another criterion that ensures the end of the negotiation process after a
ﬁnite number of transactions is the sociability. This criterion is based on a local
evaluation of the social welfare.
Deﬁnition 7 (Social agent). A pro-social agent is an agent who can only
accept transactions that increase the social welfare function of the multi-agent
system.
Deﬁnition 8 (Social transaction). A transaction is social if the value of the
social welfare function considered increases. Such a transaction can only be ac-
cepted by the involved agents if:
swU(O ) >s w U(O) O,O  ∈Osuch that O
δ −→ O .
In order to determine the value associated with the social welfare function, it is
essential to have a global knowledge of the multi-agent system state: The utility
of each agent is used to compute the social value. However, it is possible to
determine the variation of this value based on local information only:
swu(O
 ) >s w u(O)
⇒
 
a∈A
ua(R 
a) >
 
a∈A
ua(Ra)
⇒ ua(R
 
a)+ua(R
 
a) >u a(Ra)+ua(Ra).
Indeed, since only two agents are involved in a given transaction, only their
resource bundle changes. Then, the utility of the agents that are not involved in
the transaction can be considered as a constant value. Let us note that a rational
transaction is always social, whereas the opposite is not true.6
2.3 Transaction type
We can distinguish three bilateral types of transactions. Others are combinations
of these basic transaction types. In order to illustrate them, let us consider the
case where an agent initiator a negotiates with an agent a . Assume that each
of them owns ma and ma resources respectively.
First, the gift transaction. It is a transaction during which the initiator gives
one of his resources to the involved agent. The gift transaction, which is the
simplest possible one, cannot be rational for the initiator and is always rational
for the agent participant (since utilities are positive).
Then, the swap transaction. It is a transaction where each agent exchanges
a unique resource. This transaction is symmetric, i.e., an agent that initially
owns ma resources, will have the same number of resources at the end of a swap
sequence. Hence, a global optimum can be reached only if the initial resource
allocation has the same resource distribution as the one of the optimal resource
allocation. The total number of swaps between a and a  is ma × ma.
Finally, the cluster-swap (CS) is a transaction during which the agents can
involve a subset of resources. This transaction can be asymmetric. The swap is
a particular case where both agents involve only one resource each. The number
of possible cluster-swaps for a transaction initiated by agent a with agent a  is
2ma−1×2ma−1, i.e., we do not allow cluster swaps where one of the agents does
not give any of his resources.
When combining these three types of transactions with the acceptability
criteria, the following transactions can be deﬁned:
1. the social gift,
2. the social swap,
3. the rational swap,
4. the social cluster-swap,
5. the rational cluster-swap.
2.4 Communication protocol
In order to compare and evaluate the diﬀerent types of transactions, we develop a
multi-agent system with sequential negotiations: Only one agent at a time is able
to negotiate. Note that if parallel transactions were performed, except maybe for
very speciﬁc synchronisation rules, it would only aﬀect the convergence speed
but not the quality of the ﬁnal allocation.
The agent initiator is randomly chosen in the multi-agent system. Agents
accept or refuse transactions according to their own criterion. The negotiation
process ends when no agent is able to ﬁnd an acceptable transaction in his
neighborhood.
The communication protocol is described in Fig.1. In the speciﬁc case of
gift transactions, during which only the agent initiator gives a resource without
any counterpart, the dashed part should be omitted. When the agent initiator
a selects and oﬀers a resource r, the involved agent a  has to report the utility7
that he associates with a resource r and oﬀers a resource r . Then, the agent
initiator determines whether or not the transaction is acceptable. He decides to
perform the transaction if the acceptability criterion is satisﬁed for both agents,
otherwise he determines which agent has to change his oﬀer and suggest another
resource. For instance, with a utilitarian social welfare function, the test can be
made on the comparison of which resource each agent gives and which resource
each receives:
ua(r
 ) − ua(r
 ) >
? ua(r) − ua(r
 ).
If, at some point, an agent is not able to suggest an alternate resource in order
to obtain an acceptable transaction, the negotiation ends.
Fig.1. Communication protocol
3 Experiments
3.1 Experiment protocol
Experiments have been done on multi-agent systems of various sizes. For each
of them, diﬀerent types of contact network have been created, some complete
and some random with a mean connectivity degree of n/2. For each setting, a
large number of multi-agent systems has been generated, and in each case, 100
instances have been run using diﬀerent initial resource allocations.
For each negotiation process, the agent initiator is chosen randomly. He al-
ways sorts his bundle of resources according to his utility function: Even if agents8
are not rational, they try to give their resources associated with the lowest util-
ity ﬁrst. The default behavior of the agents is the negotiation with one selected
neighbor, in order to ﬁnd an acceptable deal according to the acceptability cri-
terion in use.
3.2 Evaluation criteria
An evaluation protocol has been designed in order to compare the transactions
that are used during the negotiation processes. Various criteria have been con-
sidered.
Number of performed transactions It is the overall number of transactions
that are performed during the negotiation process. Negotiations using restrictive
transactions, such as rational transactions, stop faster than negotiations using
more permissive transactions, such as social transactions.
Number of exchanged resources Some transactions, such as the cluster-
swap, tolerate that an agent involves more than one resource whereas others
prohibit it, such as the gift. One cluster-swap is equivalent to a sequence of, at
least, two gifts.
Number of speech turns It corresponds to the number of negotiations that
are initialized. If associated with the number of performed transactions, the
number of aborted negotiations can be deducted.
Number of attempted transactions Depending on the agent behavior, it
could be more or less diﬃcult to ﬁnd an acceptable deal. This criterion gives an
estimation of the negotiation length.
In addition to these criteria, we evaluate the gap between the optimal social
value and the social value associated with the resource allocation that is reached
at the end of the negotiation process.
3.3 Optimal value determination
The optimal social value associated with a resource allocation instance can be
determined by means of solving a 0 − 1 linear program. Denote again by A
the ﬁnite set of agents and by R the whole set of available resources in the
multi-agent system. The variables of this 0 − 1 linear program are:
xra =
 
1 if agent a owns resource r
0o t h e r w i s e .
r ∈R ,a∈A .9
Utilitarian case The 0−1 linear programthat corresponds to the maximization
of the utilitarian social welfare, can be written as:
sw 
u =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
max
 
a∈A
 
r∈R
ua(r)xra
subject to:
 
a∈A
xra =1 r ∈R
xra ∈{ 0,1} r ∈R ,a∈A .
Egalitarian case The 0−1 linear program that corresponds to the maximiza-
tion of the egalitarian social welfare, can be written as:
sw 
e =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
max min
a∈A
 
r∈R
ua(r)xra
subject to:
 
a∈A
xra =1 r ∈R
xra ∈{ 0,1} r ∈R ,a∈A .
It is also possible to constraint further these models in order to determine
the best social value associated with a rational resource allocation. The addition
of the following set of constraints is then required:
 
r∈R
ua(r)xra ≥ uinit
a a ∈A
where uinit
a is the initial utility of the agent a.
3.4 Utilitarian eﬃciency of the transactions
A summary of all the experiments are presented in this section. First, the results
related to a complete contact network are presented, then the results related to a
random contact network with a mean connectivity degree of n/2 .T h es i z eo ft h e
instances is characterized by n, the number of agents and m, the total number
of resources that are uniformly distributed at the outset.
The results obtained with a complete contact network are summarized in
Table 1. The social gift is the lone transaction that is always associated with a
convergence toward a global optimum. Even if, in all our experiments, a global
optimum is never reached with the other types of transactions, the gap is rela-
tively small: It is thus possible to reach a resource allocation that is socially close
to the social value of the global optimum. The negotiation processes that use
rational transactions stop further away from the optimal social value than the
ones that use social transactions as a consequence of a more restrictive criterion.
The size of the instances does not seem to have a strong impact on the quality
of the ﬁnal allocation.
Figure 2 (a) shows the number of performed transactions according to the in-
stance sizes and the types of allowed transactions. The transaction sequences are
shorter when rational agents negotiate. The social criterion is more ﬂexible, thus10
Table 1. Gap (%) on a complete contact network
n m
Social Rational
Gift Swap CS Swap CS
50 500 0 0.94 0.96 2.15 6.71
100 1000 0 0.76 0.76 1.53 4.9
150 1500 0 0.65 0.71 1.31 3.9
200 2000 0 0.56 0.60 1.15 2.5
more transactions can be performed by social agents. The number of exchanged
resources is greater in the case of social agents than with rational agents, however
the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant as shown in Fig.2 (b). Figure 2 (c) describes the
evolution of the number of speech turns. Only a weak variation can be noticed
depending on of the transaction type used. Finally, Fig.2 (d) shows the number
of attempted transactions. One can notice that using cluster-swap transactions
leads to a very large number of attempted transactions.
Results with a random contact network are shown in Table 2. The topology
of the contact network has a large impact on the quality of the ﬁnal allocation.
Depending on the used transactions, the network limits the resource exchanges.
During the experiments, the global optimum is seldom reached. The smallest gap
is always obtained by the social gift. The negotiation process ends on socially
weaker allocations if restrictive transactions are used. However, the weaker the
connectivity of the contact network is, the larger the gap is. It is a similar
behavior for the standard deviation, which is larger than with a complete contact
network.
Table 2. Gap(%) on a random contact network
n m
Social Rational
Gift Swap CS Swap CS
50 500 1.3 3.41 3.4 6.05 5.88
100 1000 0.73 1.88 1.72 3.63 3.59
150 1500 0.43 1.3 1.35 2.69 2.42
200 2000 0.31 1.22 1.02 2.3 2.05
4 Social Gift
4.1 Behavior variants
The behavior of the agents has an important impact on the quality of the resource
allocation that is ﬁnally reached. In order to study further the inﬂuence of the
agent behavior, the social gift is used on a complete contact network. If the11
(a) Number of performed transactions (b) Number of exchanged resources
(c) Number of speech turns (d) Number of attempted transactions
Fig.2. Parameter comparisons for various transaction types
agent initiator and the selected neighbor ﬁnd an acceptable transaction, they
perform it. In the case of a denial, three diﬀerent options are possible for the
agent initiator:
1. Abort the negotiation,
2. Choose another resource with the same neighbor,
3. Choose another neighbor with the same resource.
Based on this option set, four diﬀerent behaviors can be deﬁned, see Table 3
for the details. For each behavior, initiator a gives a unique resource according
to the deﬁnition of the gift in Sect.2.3. After the identiﬁcation of an acceptable
deal or the end of the negotiation, a new initiator is randomly chosen.
We ﬁrst describe behavior A. Agent initiator a selects randomly a neighbor
and tries to give him the resource associated with the lowest utility. If this is not
an acceptable transaction, then the agent initiator aborts the negotiation.
If adopting behavior B, the agent initiator a randomly selects a neighbor and
negotiates his resources, starting with the one associated with the lowest utility
and increasing it gradually. If no resource can be used to deﬁne an acceptable
transaction, then the negotiation stops.12
Behavior C is deﬁned as follows. Agent initiator a negotiates only his lowest
utility resource with all the agents of his neighborhood. In order to avoid a bias
due to the sequential selection of the selected neighbor, a random permutation is
applied on the neighbor list of the initiator. If no agent assigns a greater utility
to the resource than the initiator, then the negotiation aborts.
Last, behavior D is such that the agent initiator a negotiates every resource
as for agent behavior C, one after the other, with all his neighbors for each of
them. The same technique is used in order to avoid the bias due to a sequential
selection of the neighbor. Once the agent initiator has completed the negotiation
of all his resources with all his neighbors, he aborts the negotiation.
Table 3. Behaviors A, B, C and D of agent a
Behavior A Behavior B
a sorts his resource bundle a sorts his resource bundle
a randomly selects a neighbor a
 a randomly selects a neighbor a

a selects the resource r associated For each resource r in his bundle
with the lowest utility If the transaction is acceptable
If the transaction is acceptable a gives r to a

a gives r to a
 End of the negotiation
End of the negotiation
Behavior C Behavior D
a sorts his resource bundle a sorts his resource bundle
a selects the resource r associated For each resource r in his bundle
with the lowest utility For each neighbor a
 of a
For each neighbor a
 of a If the transaction is acceptable
If the transaction is acceptable a gives r to a

a gives r to a
 End of the negotiation
End of the negotiation
4.2 Behavior eﬃciency
The four behaviors deﬁned in Sect.4.1 have been evaluated using the criteria
deﬁned in Sect.3.2. Experiments have been conducted on a complete contact
network. The experiment protocol is as described in Sect.3.1.
In all our experiments, behaviors A and C have never been able to reach a
socially optimal resource allocation. However, the gap between the allocations
that are reached and the global optimum remains always less than 2.15%. The
mean deviation is small: Less than 0.2% in all cases. Independently of the initial
resource allocation, the allocations that are reached at the end of the negotiations
have very close social values.13
Table 4. Social gap (%) comparison of the behaviors
n m A B C D
50 500 1.2 0 1.1 0
100 1000 0.5 0 0.5 0
150 1500 0.3 0 0.3 0
200 2000 0.2 0 0.2 0
Behaviors B and D always end the negotiation process on a global optimum.
In practice, their results are identical. However,in theory, the convergencetoward
the global optimum is only guaranteed in the case of behavior D. It is always
possible to design an instance where the usage of behavior B does not allow
reaching the global optimum. However, such a guarantee has a cost as shown by
the behavior comparison in terms of performed transactions (Fig.3) (a), speech
turns (Fig.3) (b), and attempted transactions (Fig.3) (c).
As shown on Fig.3 (a), the number of performed transactions does not vary
appreciably from one behavior to the next. However, Fig.3 (b) shows that the
number of speech turns is really higher with behaviors A and B. Indeed, these
last two behaviors are focused on the negotiation with one agent whereas the
other ones can change the involved neighbor and therefore can beneﬁt from the
neighbor list. Let us note, on Fig.3 (c), that behavior D is more expensive in
terms of attempted transactions. Negotiation processes among agents that use
behavior D take more time than others.
Hence, the use of behavior B is more interesting than the use of behavior
D: While, in practice, behavior B leads to the same results than behavior D,
behavior D is more time consuming.
4.3 Proof of convergence
We now focus on behavior D, the lone behavior for which it is possible to guaran-
tee the end of the negotiation process on a resource allocation that corresponds
to a global optimum. Recall that, in the context of the study of this paper,
we only consider set of resources which are discrete, not shareable, static and
unique.
Let us introduce the allocation graph G:E a c hn o d eo fG represents a resource
allocation, and a directed link δ(O,O ) between two nodes O and O  exists if
an acceptable transaction δ which changes O in O  exists. Assume that G is a
connected graph (i.e., no isolated node).
An outgoing link δ of a node O corresponds to an acceptable transaction that
changes the resource allocation O into another one, say O . An incoming link
δ to a node O corresponds to an acceptable transaction that changes a given
initial resource allocation O  into O.
Proposition 9 (Global Optimum). Assume G is connected and all possible
allowed transactions have been translated throughout the arcs of G. Assume fur-14
(a) Number of performed transactions (b) Number of speech turns
(c) Number of attempted transactions
Fig.3. Parameter comparison for social gift transaction for various agent behaviors
ther that the contact network is complete. Any resource allocation corresponding
to a node with only incoming links is a global optimum.
Proof. A resource allocation, which corresponds to a utilitarian global optimum
is such that each resource is distributed to an agent who assigns the greatest
utility to it. Indeed, if the current resource allocation is a local or global social
optimum, no single acceptable transaction allows the improvement of the social
welfare value, meaning no outgoing link exists. In addition, since the contact
graph is complete, all optimum have the same value, hence any local optimum
is global.    
Theorem 10. The negotiation process of a multi-agent resource allocation in-
stance based on such resources and on a complete contact network converge to-
ward the global optimum using social gifts.
Proof. Since the contact network is complete, an agent can always initiate a
social gift with any other agent, which associates a greater utility to the involved
resource, unless the resource allocation is already a global optimum. Moreover,
the allocation graph G is connected: It is always possible from any initial node to
ﬁnd a sequence of social gifts leading to an optimum. Hence, the current resource
allocation is a global optimum.    15
4.4 Egalitarian eﬃciency of the social gift
Among the studied transactions in this paper, the social gift appears to be
the most eﬃcient transaction in a multi-agent negotiation process, when the
utilitarian social welfare is considered. However, the issue of the eﬃciency of
this transaction can be raised when another welfare function is considered.
The aim of the egalitarian social welfare is to maximize the utility of the
poorest agent. Thus, the standard deviation among the agent utility decreases
during the negotiation process. The social criterion in the case of the egalitarian
social welfare can be interpreted as follows: The poorest agent at the end of such
a transaction must not be poorer than the poorest agent before the transaction.
The gap between the social value of the resource allocation on which the
negotiation process ends and the social value of the global optimum are described
in Table 5. The social gift has a high gap, which means that the negotiation
Table 5. Optimality gaps for the social gift when the egalitarian welfare is considered
n − m 50 - 500 100 - 1000 150 - 1500 200 - 2000
Gap (%) 31.08 32.61 31.50 32.4
process ends on a resource allocation which is far from the global optimum.
Let us consider a multi-agent system in which the standard deviation among
the agent utility is small enough compared to the maximal utility value for a
resource. This situation is plausible since the egalitarian social welfare is consid-
ered.
Let us assume that agent a owns resource r and one of his neighbor a  owns
resource r . Their preferences are as follows: ua(r) = 50, ua(r ) = 100, ua(r)=
100, and ua(r ) = 50. In order to increase the social welfare value, these agents
have to exchange their resources. None of them is able to initiate a transaction:
If an agent gives a resource, he becomes the poorest agent and the egalitarian
welfare value decreases. Hence, the resource allocation on which the negotiation
process ends can be far from the global optimum.
The social gift is not an eﬃcient transaction when the egalitarian social wel-
fare function is considered. An eﬃcient mechanism should allow other transaction
types than the gift one.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this study, we have designed a negotiation process, which allows the multi-
agent resource allocation process to converge toward a global optimal, or when it
is not possible, toward a resource allocation that is socially close to the optimum.
This process can be used in practice thanks to a distributed approach based on
agents and to the introduction of the notion of contact network. Moreover,it is an
adaptive process: The addition of new agents is possible during the negotiation16
process without decreasing the quality of the resource allocation that is reached.
It is also an ”anytime algorithm”: The quality of the solution increases gradually
and the negotiation process can be interrupted anytime.
The described negotiation process is eﬃcient for improving the solution of
the multi-agent resource allocation problem when the utilitarian social welfare is
considered. However, it is not well-adapted to the egalitarian social welfare. New
practical enhanced negotiation processes have to be designed in such a case.
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